Representation and Reality

Part 1 Meaning and mentalism: Fodor and Chomsky three reasons why mentalism can't be right connections between 1,2, and 3. Part 2 Meaning, other people and the world: the division of linguistic labour elms, beeches and searle the contribution of the environment an indexical component other natural kinds references and theory change meaning and "Mental Representation". Part 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content": narrow content as a "Function of Observable Properties" "Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role" concluding remarks. Part 4 Are there such things as reference and truth?: why "Folk Psychology" and not "Folk Logic"? disquotation, anyone? the "Semantical Conception" of truth disquotation as disappearance. Part 5 Why functionalism didn't work: sociofunctionalism what "In Principle" means here the single-computational-state version of functionalism equivalence surveying rationality. Part 6 Other forms of functionalism: David Lewis and I Lewis's theory further examined conclusion. Part 7 A sketch of an alternative picture: objectivity and conceptual relativity internal realism as an alternative picture my present diagnosis of the "Functionalism" issue.