Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The Risk of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt
Abstract:This paper tests the hypothesis that Founding Family Controlled Firms (FFCFs) are more averse to control risk than similar non-FFCFs and therefore avoid debt. Higher levels of debt increase the likelihood of bankruptcy and the level of control risk. We show that FFCFs use less debt; their choice of debt is more sensitive to conditions associated with control risk; and that leverage is not significantly related to managerial ownership in non-FFCFs, indicating that founding family control, not managerial ownership, matters in determining leverage.
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