Economic-Robust Session Based Spectrum Trading in Multi-Hop Cognitive Radio Networks

Spectrum trading benefits primary users (PUs) by monetary gains and secondary users (SUs) by spectrum accessing opportunities in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). Unfortunately, most existing spectrum trading designs only focus on the guarantee of economic properties, but forget the wireless transmission nature, especially for multi-hop cognitive radio (CR) communications. In this paper, we propose an economic-robust session based spectrum trading, which has a joint consideration of economic properties such as incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance, and the end-to-end performance for multi-hop communications. Considering two bidding manners, i.e., bidding for the whole session and unit rate bidding, we formulate the spectrum trading optimization problems under multiple economic and multi-hop CR transmission constraints, design two pricing mechanisms to charge the winning spectrum bidders, and further mathematically prove the economic- robustness of the proposed spectrum trading schemes. Through extensive simulations, we show the proposed schemes are economic-robust and effective in improving spectrum utilization.

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