On Topology Attack of a Smart Grid: Undetectable Attacks and Countermeasures

Covert data attacks on the network topology of a smart grid is considered. In a so-called man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary alters data from certain meters and network switches to mislead the control center with an incorrect network topology while avoiding detections by the control center. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an undetectable attack is obtained for strong adversaries who can observe all meter and network data. For weak adversaries with only local information, a heuristic method of undetectable attack is proposed. Countermeasures to prevent undetectable attacks are also considered. It is shown that undetectable attacks do not exist if a set of meters satisfying a certain branch covering property are protected. The proposed attacks are tested with IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus system, and their effect on real-time locational marginal pricing is examined.

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