Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players’ bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.

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