α-Rank: Multi-Agent Evaluation by Evolution
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Christos H. Papadimitriou | Rémi Munos | Wojciech Czarnecki | Karl Tuyls | Georgios Piliouras | Marc Lanctot | Shayegan Omidshafiei | Mark Rowland | Julien Pérolat | Jean-Baptiste Lespiau | Wojciech M. Czarnecki | R. Munos | C. Papadimitriou | Mark Rowland | Marc Lanctot | K. Tuyls | J. Pérolat | G. Piliouras | J. Lespiau | Shayegan Omidshafiei | Christos Papadimitriou | M. Rowland
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