The neurodynamics of choice, value-based decisions and preference reversal

A theory of choice is paramount in all the domains of cognition requiring behav-ioural output, from perceptual choice in simple psychophysical tasks to motiva-tional value-based choice, often labelled as preferential choice and which is exhibited in daily decision-making. Until recently, these two classes of choice have been the subject of intensive but separate investigations, within different disciplines. Perceptual choice has been investigated mainly within the experimental psychology and neuroscience disciplines, using rigorous psychophysical methods that examine behavioural accuracy, response latencies (choice-RT), and neurophysiological data Preferential choice, such as when one has to choose an automobile among a set of alternatives that differ in terms of several attributes or dimensions (e.g., quality and economy) has been investigated mainly within the economics and the social science disciplines, using mainly reports of choice preference. Unlike in perceptual choice, where the dominant models are process models that approximate optimality (Bogacz et al. This has led to the proposal that decision-makers use a set of disparate heuristics, each addressing some other aspect of these deviations

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