Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin

The Bitcoin protocol requires nodes to quickly distribute newly created blocks. Strong nodes can, however, gain higher payoffs by withholding blocks they create and selectively postponing their publication. The existence of such selfish mining attacks was first reported by Eyal and Sirer, who have demonstrated a specific deviation from the standard protocol (a strategy that we name SM1).

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